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Abstract: 
In this paper, we investigate a large-scale financial statement fraud to better understand the 
process by which individuals are recruited to participate in financial statement fraud schemes. 
The case reveals that perpetrators often use power to recruit others to participate in fraudulent 
acts. To illustrate how power is used, we propose a model, based upon the classical French 
and Raven taxonomy of power, that explains how one individual influences another 
individual to participate in financial statement fraud. We also provide propositions for future 
research. 
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, fraud and other forms of unethical behavior in organizations have received 
significant attention in the business ethics literature (Uddin and Gillet, 2002; Elias, 2002; 
Rockness and Rockness, 2005; Robison and Santore, 2011), investment circles (Pujas, 2003; 
Albrecht, et al., 2011), and regulator communities (Farber, 2005; Ferrell and Ferrell, 2011). 
Scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Xerox, Quest, Tyco, HealthSouth, and other companies 
created a loss of confidence in the integrity of the American business (Carson, 2003) and 
even caused the accounting profession in the United States to reevaluate and reestablish basic 
accounting procedures (Apostolon and Crumbley, 2005). In response to the Enron scandal, 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants issued the following statement: 
 
“Our profession enjoys a sacred public trust and for more than one hundred years has served 
the public interest. Yet, in a short period of time, the stain from Enron’s collapse has eroded 
our most important asset: Public Confidence.” (Castellano and Melancon, 2002, p. 1) 
 
Financial scandals are not limited to the United States alone. Organizations in Europe, Asia 
and other parts of the world have been involved in similar situations. Notable cases include 
Parmalat (Italy), Harris Scarfe and HIH (Australia), SK Global (Korea), YGX (China), 
Livedoor Co. (Japan), Royal Ahold (Netherlands), Vivendi (France), and Satyam (India). The 
business community worldwide has experienced a syndrome of ethical breakdowns, 
including extremely costly financial statement frauds. 
An organization’s financial statements are the end product of the accounting cycle and 
provide a representation of a company’s financial position and periodic performance. The 
accounting cycle includes the procedures for analyzing, recording, classifying, summarizing, 
and reporting the transactions of a business or organization. Financial statements are a 
legitimate part of good management and provide important information for stakeholders 
(Power, 2003; Epstein et al., 2010). Financial statement fraud has been defined as an 
intentional misrepresentation of an organization’s financial statements (National Commission 
on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987). 
Financial statement fraud is primarily a top-down form of fraud that negatively impacts 
individuals, organizations, and society. As a result, it is important to understand why 
individuals become engaged in financial statement fraud. While research has suggested how a 
single individual becomes engaged in financial statement fraud (Ramos, 2003; Wolfe and 
Hermanson, 2004; LaSalle, 2007, Nocera, 2008), we still do not understand how groups of 
individuals become involved. In this paper, we seek to contribute to the literature by 
considering how top management recruits others to participate financial statement fraud. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Various efforts have been made to curb fraud and other forms of organizational corruption. 
For example, legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that was passed in 2002 by the 
United States Congress was created to minimize financial statement fraud. One of the top 
priorities of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has been to 
minimize the occurrence of fraud (Hogan et al., 2008). Other organizations, such as the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) were created to educate and train 
professionals to detect and prevent fraud. 
Research that addresses the behavioral aspects of fraud has generally focused on various 
theories of management, especially that of agency theory (Albrecht et al., 2004). Agency 
theory assumes a principle-agent relationship between shareholders and management (Jensen 
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and Meckling, 1976). Under agency theory, top managers act as ‘agents’, whose personal 
interest do not naturally align with company and shareholder interest. Agency theory assumes 
that management is typically motivated by self-interest and self-preservation. As such, 
executives will commit fraud because it is in their best, personal, short-term interest (Davis, 
et al., 1997). In order to limit financial statement fraud and other forms of organizational 
corruption, researchers suggest that organizations provide employee incentives that better 
align management behavior with shareholder goals. Furthermore, shareholders seek to 
institute controls that will limit the possibility that executives will maximize their own utility 
at the expense of shareholders (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
In the last few years, there has been an increased volume of research by scholars within the 
management community that address fraud and other forms of corruption from a humanistic 
approach. Recent research in this area has addressed circumstances that influence self-
identity in relation to organizational ethics (Weaver, 2006), collective corruption in the 
corporate world (Brief et al., 2000), normalization and socialization, including the acceptance 
and perpetuation of corruption in organizations (Anand et al., 2004), the impact of rules on 
ethical behaviour (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 2004), the mechanisms for disengaging moral 
control to safeguard social systems that uphold good behavior (Bandura, 1999), and moral 
stages (Kohlberg, 1984). In addition to this work, there has been substantial research into the 
various aspects of whistle blowing. (Dozier and Miceli, 1985; Near and Miceli, 1986). 
 
Classical Fraud Theory and the Initiation of Financial Statement Fraud 
 
Classical fraud theory has long explained the reasons that a single individual becomes 
involved in financial statement (or any type of) fraud. This theory suggests that there are 
three primary perceptions or cognitions that influence individuals’ choices to engage in fraud. 
These three factors are often represented as a triangle and consist of perceived pressure, 
perceived opportunity, and rationalization (Southerland, 1949; Cressey, 1953; Albrecht et al., 
1981). 
The first element in the fraud triangle is that of pressure or motivation. Motivation refers to 
the forces within or external to a person that affect his or her direction, intensity, and 
persistence of behavior (Pinder, 1998). At a very basic level, motivation starts with the desire 
to fulfill fundamental needs, such as food, shelter, recognition, financial means, etc. These 
desires lead to behaviors that the individual believes will result in the fulfillment of such 
needs. In financial statement fraud, the motivation or pressure experienced by the initial 
perpetrator is often related to the potential negative outcomes of reporting the firm’s true 
financial performance.  
Financial statements are used by shareholders to measure the performance of the firm versus 
expectations. The results have a significant influence on the company’s stock price. 
Executives’ job security and financial compensation are often dependent on maintaining 
strong financial performance and rising stock prices. Thus, top managers feel tremendous 
pressure to meet or exceed investors’ expectations and may even consider using fraudulent 
means to do so. 
The second element of the fraud triangle is that of opportunity. Perpetrators need to perceive 
that there is a realistic opportunity to commit the fraud without facing grave consequences. 
Opportunity is largely about perceiving that there is a method for perpetrating the fraud that 
is undetectable. A person that perceives a reasonable opportunity for fraud typically senses 
that he or she will not get caught, or it would be unlikely that any wrongdoing could be 
proven. If an individual perceives such an opportunity, he or she is much more likely to 
consider the possibility of initiating unethical actions. Of course, shareholders or boards of 
directors strive to reduce the perception of opportunity by implementing systems and controls 
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(e.g. auditing procedures) that make it more difficult to perpetuate a fraud. However, some 
people, particularly executives with considerable authority, may suppose that they can 
manipulate and control their environment in a way that will reduce the likelihood of 
detection. 
Rationalization is the third element of the triangle. Most people are basically honest and have 
intentions to be ethical. Thus, even the consideration of committing fraudulent acts results in 
significant cognitive dissonance and negative affect (Aronson, 1992; Festinger, 1957). In 
order to overcome such dissonance, fraud perpetrators generally try to find a way to reconcile 
their unethical cognitions with their core values. As a result, they seek out excuses for their 
thoughts, intentions, and behaviors through logical justification so that they may convince 
themselves that they are not violating their moral standards (Tsang, 2002). Typical excuses 
for financial statement fraud may include, “This is our only option”, “Everybody is doing it”, 
“It will only be short-term”, or “It is in the best interest of the company, shareholders, or 
employees”. Such rationalizations aim to reduce the perception of unethicality or to shift the 
balance of the equation to a more utilitarian “it may not be ideal but it is for the greater 
good.” 
Classical fraud theory suggests that fraud is most likely to take place when all three elements 
are perceived by the potential perpetrator. However, the three factors work together 
interactively so that if more of one factor is present, less of the other factors need to exist for 
fraud to occur (Albrecht et al., 1981). It is also important to note that the theory is based on 
perceptions. In other words, the pressures and opportunities need not be real, only perceived 
to be real. 
 
Collusion between Perpetrators 
 
Recent research into financial statement fraud has suggested that nearly all financial 
statement frauds are perpetrated by multiple players within the organization working together 
(The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 2002; 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012; Zyglidopoulos and Flemming, 2008, 2009; 
Burke, 2010). As such, it is necessary to understand the relationship that takes place between 
the initial perpetrator of a fraudulent act and any additional conspirators. 
Research on the perpetuation of fraud in organizations has focused on diffusion (Strang and 
Soule, 1998; Baker and Faulkner, 2003), social networking (Brass, Butterfield, and Skaggs, 
1998) and the normalization of deviant practices (Earle, Spicer and Peter, 2010). While each 
of these studies has enhanced our understanding of fraud in organizations, there remains a 
significant gap in our knowledge regarding how individuals are influenced to join a 
fraudulent scheme. In others words, we still do not know the processes by which one 
individual—after he or she has become involved in a financial statement fraud—recruits 
other individuals to participate. While the fraud triangle explains why a single individual 
becomes involved in financial statement fraud, the theory does not inform us as to how large 
groups of individuals become involved. The fraud triangle is limited in that it only provides a 
psychological glimpse of a single person’s perceptions and why he or she may choose to 
participate in fraudulent behavior through pressure, opportunity, and rationalization. We 
build on this theory by considering how the leading perpetrator may influence the perceptions 
of pressure, opportunity, and rationalization in a subordinate during the recruitment process. 
We start by presenting an illustrative strategic case of a large public financial statement fraud. 
Next, we propose a power-based, dyad reciprocal model to explain the process of how 
collusive acts, particularly those of financial statement fraud, occur in organizations. In so 
doing, we offer propositions regarding how individuals within an organization are oftentimes 
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successfully recruited to participate in financial statement scandals. We conclude with a 
discussion and recommendations for future research. 
 
Strategic Case: A Fortune 500, Billion-Dollar Fraud 
In order to better understand how individuals are recruited to participate in financial 
statement fraud, we investigated a large financial statement fraud that recently occurred at a 
U.S. “Fortune 500” company. At the time of the fraud, the company was publicly traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange and was considered to be one of the leading growth 
companies in the United States. Because the fraud is still under trailing litigation, we are not 
authorized to disclose the name of the company. However, it should be noted that the case is 
one of the well-publicized, financially significant, financial statement frauds that occurred in 
the United States over the last few years. By signing confidentiality agreements, we were able 
to interview expert witnesses and gain access to various court documents including 
depositions, complaints, pre-trial motions, amended complaints and exhibits. We spent 
hundreds of hours studying these documents. 
In our investigation, we discovered that the financial statement fraud started when significant 
financial pressure was put on management, including the CFO and others. Management was 
concerned that not meeting publicly available earnings forecasts would result in significant 
declines in the market value of the stock. By analyzing the financial statements, it is possible 
to see the exact amount that was manipulated each quarter in order to meet earnings forecasts. 
In fact, in every quarter, management guided the analysts to increasing earnings per share. 
Management would then manipulate the financial statements in exactly the amount needed to 
meet the consensus of the analyst’s forecasted expectations. For example, if real earnings per 
share were $.09 and Wall Street’s consensus expectation was $.19 per share, management 
would manipulate the statements to add $.10 per share for a total of $.19 per share. 
The chief executive officer (CEO), the chief financial officer (CFO) and the chief operating 
officer (COO) all felt substantial pressure to meet the analyst’s forecasted expectations for 
the organization. At first, management used acceptable but aggressive accounting methods to 
reach the desired numbers. When aggressive accounting methods no longer achieved the 
desired targets, the top management team pressured the CFO to do “whatever was necessary” 
to meet the published numbers.  
The CFO was left to himself to decide how to meet the objective. At first, the CFO reached 
into future reporting periods to pull back a few expected revenue transactions into the current 
period. When that was no longer plausible, the CFO used ‘topside journal entries’ 
(accounting entries made to the trial balance with no support), false revenue recognition, and 
understatement of liabilities and expenses to perpetrate the fraud. 
From our research, it is clear that while pressure came from the CEO and COO, the CFO was 
the primary manipulator of the financial statements. Unfortunately, we could not (neither 
could the courts) determine how much knowledge the CEO and COO had about the different 
types of fraudulent financial transactions that were taking place. However, in order to keep 
stock options valuable (the CEO, COO, and CFO all had stock options worth tens of millions 
of dollars) they were motivated to maintain high stock prices by meeting Wall Street earnings 
expectations every quarter. 
Because so many people were involved in preparing the financial statements of this large 
corporation, the need to involve others in the fraud became necessary. The CFO recruited the 
controller, the vice-president of accounting, the vice president of financial reporting, and the 
director of financial reporting into the fraud. This ‘inner circle’ of perpetrators understood 
most elements of the fraud, and recruited others to manipulate individual fraudulent 
transactions (including various controllers at the company’s subsidiaries). Subsidiary 
controllers then recruited others within their own organizations to help perpetrate the fraud. 
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Though the number of people involved in the fraud expanded over the years, the detailed 
knowledge of the overall fraudulent behavior was generally limited to the persons in higher 
level positions. 
Yet, even the principal perpetrators hadn’t known how many people were actually involved 
or the full extent of the financial statement losses. Court documents suggest that those in the 
third and fourth generations had very little knowledge of the scope of the fraud, yet, still 
manipulated certain transactions that enabled the fraud to be executed. 
Court documents suggest that those who participated in the fraud did so for various reasons. 
Several individuals, especially those at the executive level, became involved because they 
were promoted and received higher salaries. Nearly all the participants received, as a result of 
a higher stock price, more valuable stock options. Other individuals participated because of 
fear of dismissal or reprisal. Third and fourth generation participants, usually with little 
knowledge of the overall scheme, participated because their superiors told them to do 
something, or because they felt they did not understand exactly what was going on. Within 
the inner circle, individuals participated because they trusted their colleagues and because, at 
first, the fraudulent amounts were small. As a whole, the group rationalized their actions as 
acceptable by making ‘seemingly small rationalizations’. 
The total amount of the financial statement manipulation was between $1 billion and $3 
billion. Before the fraud was discovered, more than 30 people participated in the fraud. Many 
of these individuals had different levels of knowledge regarding the fraud. While some of the 
perpetrators had complete knowledge of the unethical acts that were occurring, others 
performed tasks simply because they were “asked to”. Those who had full knowledge of the 
fraud rationalized their acts as acceptable. They believed that the unethical financial 
statement manipulations would only be necessary for a limited time. However, when 
regulators discovered the fraudulent financial statements, the fraud had been occurring for 
over four years. 
 
Power and the Decision to Commit Financial Statement Fraud 
 
As illustrated in the case, fraud schemes are replete with the use and abuse of power. 
Perceptions of personal power and social power influence the initial decision to initiate the 
financial statement fraud and also the recruitment of others to assist and abet in the scheme. 
Personal power has been described as the ability that a person has to carry out his or her own 
will despite resistance (Weber, 1947). Social power is the ability to control the resources and 
outcomes of others (Overbeck and Park, 2001).  
Extensive research has shown that power is often misused by individuals and may lead to an 
array of negative consequences. For example, power often impairs cognition and judgments. 
Powerful people are more likely to have flawed assessments of others’ interests and emotions 
(Keltner and Robinson, 1997), to use stereotypes in forming opinions of others (Fiske, 1993), 
to seek out information that confirms their own preferences and beliefs (Ebenbach and 
Keltner, 1998), and to objectify others and treat them as a means to an end (Gruenfeld et al., 
2008). Power can have a significant effect on the way individuals think about problems and 
the 
consideration of potential solutions to overcome the obstacles. 
In evaluating the role of power in financial statement fraud, we will first consider the decision 
to initiate a financial statement fraud and the decision-maker’s power in this process. When 
viewed through the lens of the fraud triangle, we argue that power differentially affects the 
perceptions of pressure, opportunity, and rationalization. Personal power is likely to be 
inversely related to pressure. An individual that is high in power feels in control of his or her 
outcomes and is less susceptible to external pressure (Pfeffer and Fong, 2005). Power tends to 
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reduce the threat of losses (Inesi, 2010) which alters the motivational mechanisms within 
individuals. For example, a powerful CEO that is also Chairman and feels in control of the 
board of directors will likely feel less threat of negative consequences from unmet 
expectations than one with less power. Similarly, the CEO/Owner of a private company is in 
a position of power relative to an executive of a public company regarding the personal 
outcomes associated with the company’s performance. Thus, the owner of the private 
company would typically feel significantly less pressure to fudge the numbers. 
 
Proposition 1: The more personal power that an individual has, the less likely he or she is to 
perceive external pressure to perpetrate a financial statement fraud. 
 
On the other hand, power is likely to increase the perception of opportunity. Power tends to 
reduce the influence of constraints on the pursuit of goals (Keltner, et al., 2003). When 
constraints are discounted, the opportunities look more plausible. Having power tends to 
deactivate the behavioral inhibition system that generally sends the warning signals about 
potentially detrimental behaviors (Anderson and Berdahl, 2002). Thus, power increases the 
likelihood of risk-seeking behavior 
(Anderson and Galinsky, 2006) and the disregard for social norms (Galinsky et al., 2008). 
Such power related biases are liable to influence the viability of an opportunity to accomplish 
a goal by any means necessary, even financial statement fraud. For instance, a CFO with 
substantial power is more likely to believe that he or she could manage a fraud scheme 
without getting caught than a CFO with less power. 
 
Proposition 2: The more personal power that an individual has, the more likely he or she is 
to perceive an opportunity to perpetrate a financial statement fraud. 
 
Rationalization is the third element of the fraud triangle that contributes to unethical decision-
making. Research suggests that individuals with high power are often susceptible to moral 
hypocrisy and are less strict than the powerless in the moral judgment of their own behavior 
(Lammers et al., 2010). They often feel a sense of entitlement even if their behavior may 
cause harm to others (Rosenblatt, 2012). The powerful are more prone than those with less 
power to the rationalization of self interest (Keltner, et al., 2006). The rationalization may be 
so compelling that the individual makes seemingly irrational judgments of the morality of his 
or her behavior. It was recently reported that Dennis Kozlowski, the disgraced former CEO of 
Tyco International, rejected a plea deal that would have reduced his prison sentence because 
he was living in a “CEO-type bubble” and had “rationalized” that he was not guilty 
(Dolmetsch and Van Voris, 2012). 
 
Proposition 3: The more personal power that an individual has, the more likely he or she will 
develop rationalizations for perpetrating a financial statement fraud. 
 
Power and the Recruitment of Co-conspirators 
 
Social power has been repeatedly studied by management and social psychology scholars and 
a number of theories and taxonomies of power have emerged. The most prominent of these 
approaches include the power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1962), Kipnis, Schmidt, and 
Wilkinson’s typology of influence tactics (Kipnis et al., 1980), and the French and Raven 
framework of power (French and Raven, 1959). Recent research argues that these theories of 
power have become the most commonly referenced frameworks for understanding social 
power in management (Kim et al., 2005). In applying these different taxonomies to the case 
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study, we determined that the French and Raven (1959) framework provides the most insight 
into the recruitment process as it is the only framework that suggests how power is derived 
between two individuals. Such a perspective is important when analyzing the relationship that 
takes place in the recruitment of individuals in a financial statement fraud (Dapiran and 
Hogarth-Scott, 2003). 
French and Raven’s theory suggests that there are five different sources of social power. The 
power possessed by person A is based on person B’s perception of A’s role, characteristics, 
and relationship with B. Specifically, the types of power possessed by A may include (1) 
coercive power (B perceives that A has the ability to punish B if B does not comply with A’s 
demands), (2) reward power (B perceives that A has the ability to reward B if B does comply 
with A’s wishes), (3) expert power (B perceives that A possesses special knowledge or 
expertise that merits deference), (4) legitimate power (B perceives that A has a legitimate role 
or position that obligates B to follow A’s direction), and (5) referent power (B identifies with, 
admires, or respects A so B wishes to emulate A). It is important to note that in the case of 
power, perception becomes reality (Wolfe and McGinn, 2005). In other words, even if A 
would not be deemed to have any rightful power over B by impartial observers, if B 
perceives A to have power, then A does have power. 
Drawing upon these five types of power, we propose a power-based model to help explain 
how individuals use power to recruit others to participate in financial statement fraud. In 
developing the model, we propose that a person in a position of power (Person A), such as a 
CEO will use power to influence another individual (Person B) to participate in the fraudulent 
scheme. In so doing, A seeks to apply pressure on B, help B perceive a reasonable 
opportunity, and provide possible rationalizations for B. This process is shown in Figure I: 
 
Insert Figure I About Here 
 
Pressure 
Pressure is a key component of recruiting co-conspirators to participate in a fraud. People in 
positions of power often have the ability to apply pressure on targets of interest. Perceived 
reward power is the ability of the conspirator to convince potential co-conspirators that he or 
she will provide desired benefits through participation in a financial statement fraud. The 
recruiter may encourage the individual to participate in the scheme through the promise of a 
large bonus, rewards from valuable stock options, other types of equity payments, or possibly 
even a job promotion. 
Perceived coercive power is the ability of the conspirator to make the potential co-conspirator 
perceive potential punishment if he or she doesn’t participate in a financial statement fraud. 
This potential punishment is usually based on fear (Politis, 2005). If the potential co-
conspirator perceives that the perpetrator has the ability to punish him or her in any way, the 
perpetrator begins to exercise a form of coercive power over that individual. From a coercive 
power perspective, the recruiter may pressure a potential co-conspirator to participate in the 
scheme by suggesting they may lose their job, receive public humiliation, be victimized as a 
whistle-blower, or be punished in some other way. While not as common, expert power may 
be used to pressure individuals to participate in the scheme by suggesting that the recruiter 
has expert knowledge about the business and how it should run. Similarly, since financial 
statement fraud typically occurs from the top-down, conspirators may pressure employees to 
participate because he or she ‘is the boss’. Finally, referent power may be used to pressure 
trusted friends and colleagues to participate in the scheme.  
 
Proposition 4: Reward power and coercive power are the most effective forms of social 
power that may be used to apply pressure on potential co-conspirators. 
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Opportunity 
 
A person that is being recruited to participate in fraud may feel ample pressure to take part 
and thus have the desire or motivation to do so. However, another important element in the 
process is the perception that there is a reasonable opportunity to commit the fraud. Much of 
the perception of opportunity is related to the person’s own job responsibilities and skills. For 
example, an accountant that has primary responsibility for managing division accounts may 
feel some sense of opportunity to alter the numbers by virtue of his or her position. Yet, 
senior management may further influence the perception of opportunity through the use of 
social power. 
It is likely that the original conspirator will influence his or her target of influence so that 
they believe their actions can be made without threat of serious consequence. Based on our 
case analysis, we propose that the most common type of power used to create perceived 
opportunities include expert and legitimate power. 
Perceived expert power is the ability of the conspirator to use influence through means of 
expertise or knowledge. From an expert power perspective, perpetrators influence victims to 
believe that they have insight and knowledge about the financial transactions of the firm, 
including how the transactions are to be observed and recorded. An example of a financial 
fraud that appears to have been the result of perceived expert power is Enron. Certain 
members of management claimed to have expert knowledge regarding complicated business 
organizations and arrangements.1 
Individuals, who would have otherwise refused to join the conspiracy based upon personal 
ethical standards, convinced themselves that the conspirators knew more about the complex 
transactions than they did.  
Perceived legitimate power is the ability of Person A to convince Person B that A truly does 
have real power over him or her. In business settings, individuals such as the chief executive 
officer, or other members of management, claim to have legitimate power to make decisions 
and direct the organization – even if that direction is unethical. In this way, conspirators 
assume authoritative roles and convince potential co-conspirators that their authority is 
legitimate. Such perceptions may help the recruit feel that the opportunity is indeed 
reasonable since the leader supports and/or condones the action. 
 
Proposition 5: Expert power and legitimate power are the most effective forms of social 
power that may be used to increase the perception of opportunity for potential co-
conspirators. 
 
Rationalization 
 
We propose that fraud perpetrators use power to encourage victims to rationalize their actions 
as acceptable. While perpetrators will use all five types of power to do this, we suggest 
perpetrators most often use referent, legitimate, and expert power for rationalization. 
Perceived referent power is the ability of the conspirator to relate to the target of influence 
(co-conspirators). Conspirators using referent power will build relationships of confidence 
with potential co-conspirators.  
Perpetrators often use perceived referent power to gain confidence and participation from 
potential co-conspirators when performing unethical acts. Many individuals, when persuaded 
by a trusted friend to participate in a financial statement fraud, will rationalize the actions as 
being justifiable. Perpetrators may influence their friends and co-workers to participate in the 
fraud by portraying attitudes such as, ‘everyone is doing it’, ‘it’s no big deal’, ‘it’s only 
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temporary’ or ‘it’s necessary’. Furthermore, perpetrators will influence colleagues and friends 
simply by modeling inappropriate behavior. When perpetrators openly engage in dishonest 
acts, it suggests that inappropriate behavior is acceptable and within the norms of the 
organization.  
From a legitimate power perspective, perpetrators will encourage subordinates to rationalize 
the fraud as acceptable. Perpetrators may do so by labeling the fraud as acceptable and by 
suggesting that, ‘this is how things are done around here’. When individuals within the 
organization see their bosses engaging in fraudulent behavior, it sends a message that such 
behavior is acceptable. ‘If it wasn’t acceptable’, these people rationalize, ‘the boss wouldn’t 
be doing it’.  
Finally, from an expert-power perspective, many potential victims simply accept that they 
must engage in such unethical behavior because ‘others know more than I do about the 
operations of the business, market, industry, etc.’ Such an attitude may be even more 
compelling in fraudulent financial scandals when lower-level personnel see both internal and 
external auditors signing off (or accepting) the fraudulent transactions. 
 
Proposition 6: Referent power, legitimate power and expert power are the most effective 
forms of social power that may be used to help potential coconspirators form satisfactory 
rationalizations regarding fraudulent behavior. 
 
Summary of the Model 
 
In our model, we propose that whether or not the individual (person B) is recruited into the 
financial statement fraud depends upon various factors such as the individual’s desire (Person 
B) for a reward or benefit, the individual’s fear of punishment, the individual’s perceived 
level of personal knowledge, the individual’s level of obedience to authority, and the 
individual’s personal relationship needs. The model displayed is interactive meaning that 
these five types of power often work together to influence a potential perpetrator. For 
example, if reward power were being used to influence another person, and the individual in 
position B had a specific need for a reward or benefit, then the perceived reward or benefit 
that A must provide doesn’t have to be as significant as if B were not in need of such a 
reward or benefit. In this sense, when successful recruitment occurs, there is a balance 
between B’s susceptibility of power and A’s exertion of power.  
Once the potential co-conspirator (position B) becomes involved in the unethical scheme, this 
person often switches to position A, and becomes another perpetrator of the fraud scheme. 
Using his or her own perceived power with his or her subordinates, this person will often 
recruit others to participate in the unethical acts. This spillover effect continues until an 
individual either blows the whistle or until the scheme(s) becomes so large and egregious that 
it is discovered. As the fraud scheme continues to grow, we propose that there is a direct 
effect on the organizational culture of the firm. Culture has been explained as, “the collective 
programming of the mind that manifests itself not only in values, but also in superficial ways, 
including symbols, heroes, and rituals” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 1). It has been suggested that 
spoiled organizational images often transfer to additional organizational members (Sutton and 
Callahan, 1987). Therefore, the once ethical organization, with no members involved in the 
financial statement fraud scheme, gradually transforms itself into an organization that fosters 
unethical behavior. In the process, individuals, as a result of socialization (Anand, et al., 
2004) and diffusion (Myers, 2000; Baker and Faulkner; 2003), begin to understand and 
accept the scheme as justifiable. 
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Evaluation of the Model with the Case 
 
Using our proposed model, we can better understand the process of recruitment as illustrated 
in the case study. The model suggests that unethical acts begin with an individual conspirator 
or, in some cases, a small group of conspirators. These individuals are usually motivated 
because they rationalize that the consequences (lack of rewards or penalties) of not 
committing the act are worse than the consequences of the act itself. To this end, individuals 
begin to perpetrate unethical acts, and, on an ‘as-needed basis’, recruit others to participate in 
the scheme.  
With nearly 30 individuals involved in perpetrating the fraud, our investigation suggests that 
all five types of power were used. For example, in court documents, perpetrators often 
discussed stock options (reward power), the promise of promotions (reward power), the fear 
of a lower stock price (coercive power), the fear of being unsuccessful (coercive power), 
whistle-blower fears (coercive power), trust between co-workers (referent power), obedience 
to management (legitimate power), as well as the lack of knowledge that many of them had 
(expert power). 
 
Discussion and Opportunities for Future Research 
 
While our model on the recruitment of individuals into financial statement fraud schemes is 
grounded in power theory, it is difficult to empirically test the model (this is true with most 
fraud models). First, many acts, because of public embarrassment and legal fears, are handled 
quietly and never made public. Second, even when the fraud is made public, most of the 
details about colluding perpetrator relationships never surface. Despite these challenges, we 
are hopeful that our model can be tested empirically. 
Auerbah and Dolan (1997) suggest that understanding the various types of power does not 
tell us how power is used to influence others. Rather, they explain that it is important to 
understand the strategies that are employed by individuals – in the case of this research – the 
strategies used to influence others to participate in financial statement fraud. Future research 
must help identify the exact strategies that perpetrators use to recruit others to participate in 
financial statement fraud schemes.  
With financial statement frauds being perpetrated throughout all parts of the world, there is a 
need to address the international aspects of power. We must better understand how a 
country’s culture affects the strategies that are employed by individuals to influence others. 
This research must address issues such as whether one type of power is more dominate than 
the other types of power regardless of culture. There are now several excellent frameworks 
for studying cultural values including Hofstede (1980), Schwartz (1992, 2005), Trompenaars 
(1993) as well as the framework provided by House, et al. (2004). Similarly, it is important to 
understand if one type of power always plays a dominant role in organizational corruption or 
if power is situational. Along this same line of reasoning, research must address if individuals 
are inherently susceptible to certain types of power. Future research must examine how 
differences in personalities and backgrounds affect responses to power, especially the way 
that different personalities respond when coupled with the influence to participate in financial 
statement fraud and other forms of organizational corruption. Some basic descriptive studies 
might address the range of criteria that individuals use to define the relationships they have 
with those who are in positions of power. This area must address how the various types of 
power are defined.  
Furthermore, various constructs such as the desire for a reward or benefit, the fear of 
punishment, the lack of knowledge, the level of obedience, and relationship needs must be 
more fully understood. Understanding the emotions surrounding these constructs may help us 
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understand why some people become involved in organizational corruption while others do 
not. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have proposed a power-based, dyad reciprocal model to explain the process 
by which fraud perpetrators recruit individuals to participate in financial statement frauds. 
Previous research has suggested that a key element of fraud prevention is educating 
employees and others about the serious of fraud and informing them what to do if fraud is 
suspected (Albrecht et al., 2011). Educating employees about fraud and providing fraud 
awareness training helps ensure that frauds that do occur are detected at early stages, thus 
limiting financial exposure to the corporation and minimizing the negative impact of fraud on 
the work environment. The model provided in this paper provides shareholders with a 
valuable tool to educate employees and others about fraud. 
The model presented fills an important void in the fraud literature. For many years, the fraud 
triangle, with its limited predictive ability, has provided the accounting and criminology 
fields with a basis as to why individuals participate in fraudulent behavior. The fraud triangle 
has been used to further education, research, and practical agendas. As such, it has provided a 
framework to reference when establishing safeguards and other controls to protect businesses 
from fraud.  
Furthermore, the fraud triangle has allowed the scientific community to better understand the 
constructs that are at play when an individual becomes involved in financial statement fraud. 
Our model provides a valuable corollary to the fraud triangle. Used together, we can not only 
understand how a single individual becomes involved in fraud but how entire management 
teams become involved in fraud. If the model described in this paper is used by organizations 
in their fraud prevention programs, employees can better identify and understand the types of 
power that may possibly influence them to participate in fraud schemes. The practical 
application of the model is that it empowers individuals within an organization against 
negative and/or unethical influence. 
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Figure I: Dyad Reciprocal Model 
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